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Abstract
This Working Paper analyses the cost implications of the multi-sector convergence approach of
burden sharing for the period 2013-2017 as outlined in a previous Working Paper of the Burden
Sharing study project (Jansen et al., 2000). It compares these costs with the burden differentia-
tion of emission mitigation as agreed in the Kyoto Protocol for the first budget period (2008-
2012). The analysis of cost implications of burden sharing resulting from the multi-sector con-
vergence approach versus the Kyoto Protocol will both include and exclude the use of the Kyoto
Mechanisms (Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation and the Clean Development Mecha-
nism).
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SUMMARY
This report provides an indication of the cost implications of the multi-sector convergence ap-
proach of burden sharing with regard to the so-called ‘second budget period’ (2013-2017). This
approach offers a new sector-based framework for negotiating binding emission targets after the
first budget period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012), based on (i) the distinction of different
sectors in the national economy, and (ii) the prescriptive norm that ultimately the amount of per
capita emission assignments has to converge to the same level for all countries.
The cost indications of the multi-sector convergence approach for the years 2013-2017 are
based on a model previously developed by ECN to study the impact of the Kyoto Mechanisms -
i.e. Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism - in re-
ducing GHG emissions. The outstanding characteristic of this model is that it covers all six
GHGs, all three Kyoto Mechanisms and all major countries/regions in the world within an inte-
grated, bottom-up approach.
If all reduction requirements of all Annex-I countries - resulting from the multi-sector conver-
gence approach with regard to the second budget period - will be fully realised domestically,
total annual direct abatement costs are estimated at 133 billion US$ (i.e. about 0.3 percent of
their GDP in that period). However, in the case of unrestricted global emission trade, Annex I
countries will meet some 50 percent of their reduction commitments abroad by means of the
Kyoto Mechanisms. As a result, total annual direct abatement costs during the second budget
period for all Annex I countries will fall to about 44 billion US$ (i.e. about 0.1 of their GDP),
whereas non-Annex I countries are even able to realise net profits of almost 10 billion US$ by
exporting CDM emission credits.
The major lesson or conclusion of the present report is that allocation-based burden sharing
rules in terms of setting emission limitation targets related to a specific reference year have only
a relative meaning compared to other, outcome-based burden sharing indicators. The main rea-
son for this finding is that the burden of emission mitigation is not only determined by the set-
ting of emission limitation targets related to a specific reference year but also by other factors
such as:
• trends in GHG emissions between the reference and target years as determined by popula-
tion/economic growth and other autonomous (technology) trends regarding GHG emissions,
• major differences in abatement potentials and costs among countries and regions,
• including or excluding the (unrestricted/limited) use of the Kyoto Mechanisms,
• including or excluding no-regret options in (inter)national abatement strategies.
Hence, these factors have to be accounted for when designing and negotiating allocation based
burden sharing rules for the years following the first budget period of the Kyoto Protocol.
The above-mentioned results should be interpreted carefully as the underlying analysis is char-
acterised by data uncertainties, methodological shortcomings and other limitations such as the
exclusion of implementation and macroeconomic costs resulting from mitigation policies. At
the present stage of climate policy research, the major aim of the present study is just to give an
indication of the direct abatement costs of the multi-sector convergence approach - notably in
relative terms - and, above all, to analyse the factors and the underlying, structural causal rela-
tionships that affect the estimated outcome of the burden sharing indicators considered.
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1. INTRODUCTION
In the fifth Working Paper of the Burden Sharing project (Jansen et al., 2000), the multi-sector
convergence approach has been developed. This approach has resulted in a set of emission
limitation targets for a large sample of countries with regard to the years following the first
budget period of the Kyoto Protocol. These targets give an impression of burden sharing among
countries in terms of reduction percentages or amounts of emissions to be mitigated. However,
they do not provide an indication of burden sharing in terms of costs involved. The latter, i.e.
indicating the cost implications of the multi-sector convergence approach is the main intention
of the present report.
The cost analyses included in this report are based on a model previously developed by ECN to
study the impact of the Kyoto Protocol in general and the role of the Kyoto Mechanisms - i.e.
Emissions Trading, Joint Implementation and the Clean Development Mechanism - in reducing
GHG emissions in particular. The outstanding characteristic of this model is that it covers all six
GHGs, all three Kyoto Mechanisms and all major countries/regions in the world within an inte-
grated, bottom-up approach (Sijm et al., 2000). One of the opportunities of this model is to es-
timate the costs of emission limitation commitments of the Annex I countries with regard to the
so-called first budget period of the Kyoto Protocol (2008-2012). By adding some small adjust-
ments to this model, it can also be used to estimate the cost effects of the multi-sector conver-
gence approach of burden sharing among the countries/regions included in the model for the
subsequent, second budget period (2013-2017).
The structure of the present report runs as follows. Firstly, Chapter 2 presents a brief outline of
the methodology of the model and data sources used to estimate the cost implications of burden
sharing arrangements such as the Kyoto Protocol or the multi-sector convergence approach.
Subsequently, Chapter 3 discusses and compares the cost implications of the Kyoto Protocol in
the first budget period (2008-2012) versus the multi-sector convergence approach during the
second budget period (2013-2017). Finally, a summary and conclusion of this paper are pro-
vided in Chapter 4.
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2. METHODOLOGY AND DATA SOURCES
2.1 A model simulation of trading emission credits
The methodology followed in this report is based upon a model developed by ECN to simulate a
market for trading emission credits among countries in order to indicate the potential role and
cost impact of the Kyoto Mechanisms in meeting GHG limitation commitments of Annex I
countries as agreed in the Kyoto Protocol. The term ‘emission credits’ is used as the collective
concept for credits generated and transferred by means of one or more of the Kyoto Mecha-
nisms, i.e. Emissions Trading (ET), Joint Implementation (JI) or the Clean Development
Mechanism (CDM). It is assumed that these emission credits are traded on an integrated market.
In addition, the approach outlined below is based on the following assumptions:
• no restrictions on trading emission credits,
• no transaction costs for generating and trading emission credits,
• no risks and uncertainties, i.e. information is fully and freely available,
• no institutional changes affecting the market of emission credits,
• no strategic or dominant behaviour of market parties,
• market parties act rationally, i.e. they are maximising their objectives while minimising
costs.
For individual countries (or regions), the methodology applied can be illustrated graphically by
means of Figure 2.1. Quantities of emission credits - in tonnes of CO2 equivalents - are indi-
cated by the X-axis, whereas the price or cost of emission credits is reflected by the Y-axis.
Emission reduction options and corresponding marginal cost levels are represented in Figure 2.1
by marginal cost curves for two different countries, A and B, indicated by MCa and MCb, re-
spectively. These curves express the supply of emission credits of the countries concerned.
The demand for emission credits depends on the amount of GHG emissions that a country is
obliged to reduce. In Figure 2.1, this demand is represented by a vertical line for countries A
and B, called Ta and Tb, respectively. In case of ‘no trade’ (i.e. no use of Kyoto Mechanisms),
the intersection of this line and the MC curve determines the equilibrium price (Pa and Pb) on the
domestic market of emission credits.
By allowing international trade in emission credits, price differences between countries will dis-
appear, resulting in a global equilibrium price of emission credits (Pm). In such a situation,
countries will reduce their domestic GHG emissions up to the point where their domestic mar-
ginal abatement costs are equal to Pm. In Figure 2.1, country A will reduce the amount of Qa
emissions at home and buy the remaining amount (Ta - Qa) abroad in order to achieve its Kyoto
target of Ta. In this case, total abatement costs of country A are equal to the area OTaVU. Com-
pared to the case of ‘no trade’, this implies a net saving of total abatement costs corresponding
to area UVW. For country B, the amount of domestic emission reductions will be Qb, whereas
only Tb is required, resulting in exports of emission credits (Qb - Tb), and net trading profits cor-
responding to area XYZ. Hence, the use of Kyoto Mechanisms is profitable for both importing
and exporting countries of emission credits.1
                                                
1 Non-Annex I countries are not obliged to reduce GHG emissions.  In that case, Tb is equal to O, whereas the net
gains from trading emission credits correspond to area OYPm in the right part of Figure 1.
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Figure 2.1  Market of emission credits
To summarise, the approach outlined above enables one to determine the equilibrium price of
emission credits both ‘before trade’ and ‘after trade’, the marginal and total abatement costs be-
fore and after trade for each country or region included in the model, the amounts of emissions
reduced at home and traded abroad, and the cost savings or ‘net gains’ of importing or exporting
emission credits by means of the Kyoto Mechanisms ET, JI or CDM. Moreover, by adding data
on GDP or population to the model, a variety of additional indicators - such as emissions per
capita or abatement costs as a percentage of GDP - can be calculated. In addition, this approach
enables one to analyse the impact of so-called ‘ceilings’ on using Kyoto Mechanisms as well of
the effects of alternative burden sharing rules to reduce GHG emissions (compared to those
agreed as part of the Kyoto Protocol).2
2.2 Data sources and qualifications
The present study relies heavily on the availability and reliability of a large variety of data for a
large number of countries and regions. The most important data concern:
• National or regional GHG emissions in the reference year (i.e. 1990/95) and two future
years (i.e. 2010 and 2015, as representative of the periods 2008-2012 and 2013-2017, re-
spectively). By means of these data and certain reduction targets - derived from the Kyoto
Protocol and the multi-sector convergence approach, respectively - national or regional re-
duction requirements have been calculated in terms of physical quantities of GHG emis-
sions3.
• The potential and costs to reduce GHG emissions in a certain country or region. These data
have been used to determine individual cost curves for the reduction of GHG emissions in a
particular country or region. Subsequently, these individual curves have been added up and
combined into aggregated cost curves covering several or all GHGs, countries and/or re-
gions. Finally, this process of adding up cost curves has resulted in the construction of a
world-wide cost curve for the reduction of all GHG emissions.
• GDP and population size in 1990, 2010 and 2015.4
Table 2.1 provides an overview of the major sources of the data used for the present study. The
main limitations and other qualifications of these data will be discussed below. More details can
be found in the data sources and references mentioned in Table 2.1.
                                                
2 See, for instance, Van Harmelen et al. (1997), Koutstaal et al. (1998), Gielen et al. (1999) and Ybema et al. (1999).
3 For a discussion of the data with regard to GHG emissions in 1990 and 2010, see Sijm, et al. (2000) and references
cited there, notably Olivier, et al. (1996), Alcamo, et al. (1998), and Fennhann (2000).
4 GDP and population data are based on World Bank (1997 and 1999), and IEA (1998).
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Table 2.1  Overview of major data used in present study
Western Annex I CEE/FSU Annex I Non-Annex I
Emissions: 5
CO2 (1990, 2010/15) 2, 4, 5 1 6, 7
N2O/CH4 (1990, 2010/15) 4, 5, 6, 7 6, 7 6, 7
Other GHG (1990, 2010/15) 4, 5, 8 8 8
Cost Curves:
CO2 (2010/15) 2, 4, 5 1 3
Other/Total GHGs (2010/15) 4 4 4
Other Data:
GDP/Population (1990, 2010/15) 9, 10, 11, 12 9, 10, 11, 12 9, 10, 11, 12
1=Van Harmelen et al. (1997), 2=Koutstaal et al. (1998), 3=Van der Linden et al. (1999), 4=Gielen et al. (1998),
5=Ybema et al. (1999), 6=Olivier et al. (1996), 7=Alcamo et al. (1998, Scenario B), 8=Fennhann (2000), 9=World
Bank (1997), 10=World Bank (1999), 11=CIA (1999), 12=IEA (1998).
In general, data on emission levels are less uncertain for CO2 than for the other GHGs.6 In addi-
tion, emission data seem to be more reliable, more readily available and more detailed for west-
ern Annex I countries than for countries in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), the Former So-
viet Union (FSU), and - particularly - the non-Annex I region. Moreover, estimates of emission
levels for the reference year (1990/95) are less uncertain compared to baseline projections for
the year 2010 as the latter are based on assumptions regarding trends in economic growth, eco-
nomic structure and technological innovations. These assumptions vary per study. The conse-
quences of these uncertainties are two-fold. Firstly, data on emission levels have to be inter-
preted with the necessary prudence. Secondly, estimates of emission levels may sometimes vary
(significantly) by source or reference used, depending on the method of estimation, the major
assumptions applied and adjustments made in the course of time. In general, the present study
has tried to use the most reliable data, occasionally updated or adjusted to more recent informa-
tion and insights.7
Marginal cost curves for reducing CO2 emissions in western Annex I countries have been de-
rived from ETSAP and COHERENCE studies, based on detailed energy and technology bot-
tom-up models such as MARKAL and EFOM (Van Harmelen, et al., 1997, and Koutstaal et al.,
1998). This type of model studies offers an optimisation strategy to achieve national emission
reduction targets given certain economic and technological prior conditions such as interna-
tional energy prices, characteristics of the energy sector, available emission reduction options,
and expectations regarding future energy demand and economic structure. Hence, cost estimates
of future emission reductions based on such models depend critically on assumptions made re-
garding these prior conditions. Other limitations of bottom-up studies refer to a lack of mutual
comparability and the exclusion of cost effects and interactions at the macroeconomic level.
                                                
5 Excluding sinks, i.e. changes in GHG emissions due to land use changes and forestry activities. In general, emis-
sion projections for the year 2015 are simple extrapolations of projections for the year 2010 (see Sijm et al., 2000
and references cited there). The major exceptions concern Germany, the United Kingdom and the countries of
CEE/FSU (both Annex I and non-Annex I). Whereas these countries are characterised by declining or stagnating
emission projections for the years 1990-2010, an increase of GHG emissions has been assumed for the period
2010-2015 of 3 percent for Germany and the United Kingdom and, on average, of 10 percent for the CEE/FSU
countries.
6 See Sijm et al. (2000) for a discussion of data uncertainties regarding non-CO2 GHG emissions in EU Member
States.
7 For additional remarks and other details on emission data of EU Member States, see Gielen et al. (1999) and
Ybema et al. (1999).
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For Annex I countries in the CEE/FSU region, CO2 marginal reduction cost curves are scarcely
available. As part of a previous study on Joint Implementation (Van Harmelen et al., 1997),
ECN has estimated the potential and costs of reducing CO2 emissions by means of two types of
studies. Estimates of the demand-side potential and costs of CO2 emission reductions have been
based on energy-efficiency studies of the OECD (1996a and 1996b), whereas the supply-side
potential and costs have been estimated by means of model simulations constructed by ECN for
Slovakia and the Czech Republic (Van Harmelen et al., 1994a and 1994b; IEA, 1995; and De
Kruijk et al., 1993). These estimates, however, have to be treated with caution as they suffer
from uncertainties with regard to the availability of the so-called ‘profitable reduction potential’
(i.e. ‘no-regret’ options characterised by negative reduction costs). Therefore, ECN has devel-
oped two variants of the cost curve concerned, one including and one excluding this profitable
potential.8
For the non-Annex I region as a whole, an emission abatement cost curve has been derived from
information on the costs and potential of reducing GHG emissions in this region (Van der Lin-
den et al., 1999). This information has been collected from a large variety of abatement costing
studies covering some 300 GHG reduction options in non-Annex I countries. As these options
concern mainly energy-related CO2 emissions, the final result can be regarded as predominantly
a CO2 reduction cost curve. This result, however, has to be interpreted cautiously because of
several critical limitations involved:9
• The total potential of reduction options is based on abatement costing studies in 24 non-
Annex I countries - accounting for two-thirds of total GHG emissions in the non-Annex I
region - and extended to the rest of this region, using a simple extrapolation method (i.e.
scaling up potential by a factor 1.5).
• On the one hand, the total potential of reduction options may be heavily underestimated as
numerous abatement costing studies excluded significant reduction options, notably outside
the energy sector. On the other hand, it may be largely overestimated, as actual investor
costs are likely to substantially exceed economic costs represented in the abatement studies.
• Transaction costs of potential CDM projects have often been excluded.
The potentials and costs of reducing emissions of non-CO2 GHGs are based on a variety of
studies as discussed by Gielen and Kram (1998). These studies focus on emission abatement
options in EU Member States. Due to lack of empirical data, estimates of non-CO2 reduction
cost curves for non-EU countries and regions have also been based on these studies supple-
mented and adjusted by expert guesses of ECN staff.
For all countries and regions mentioned above, the same cost curves have been used for the first
and second budget periods. It has been assumed that the most efficient - i.e. cheapest - emission
reduction options will be used during the first budget period (2008-2012), followed by the sub-
sequent, least-cost abatement opportunities in the second budget period (2013-2017).
Another limitation of the present analysis is that estimates of abatement potentials are based on
reduction options that are assumed to be technically feasible. The present quantitative analysis,
however, has not considered all kinds of political and institutional constraints to realise abate-
ment projects, particularly in non-Annex I and CEE/FSU Annex I countries. Moreover, the
Kyoto Mechanisms are still characterised by several unresolved issues with regard to their de-
sign and implementation (including the imposition of ‘ceilings’ on the use of the Kyoto Mecha-
nisms). As a result, abatement potentials may be smaller or more expensive than supposed in
this study, leading to less trade in emission credits and higher reduction costs. On the other
hand, there might be a large potential of (cheap) reduction options - particularly in non-Annex I
                                                
8 It should be noted that the present study has aggregated the Annex I countries of CEE/FSU into one region,
whereas the JI study has also analysed CO2 emission levels, reduction potentials and costs for individual countries.
For details, see Van Harmelen et al. (1997).
9 For details and some other limitations, see Van der Linden et al. (1999).
ECN-C--01-008 11
countries - which have not yet been identified and, hence, not included in the present analysis,
implying that reduction costs may be estimated too high and trade options too low.
A final, but major qualification of the present study is that it is based on a static and partial,
bottom-up analysis, i.e. it assesses only direct abatement costs but excludes other cost categories
such as implementation costs and macroeconomic costs due do dynamic and feed-back effects
of mitigation policies at both the project, sectoral and national level.
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3. COSTS OF THE MULTI-SECTOR CONVERGENCE APPROACH
3.1 Introduction
This chapter analyses the cost implications of the multi-sector convergence approach of burden
sharing with regard to the so-called ‘second budget period’ (2013-2017). These cost implica-
tions will be indicated for all major individual countries of the western Annex I region and for
the Annex I countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the Former Soviet Union as a whole
(CEE/FSU Annex I region).10 Cost implications will not be indicated for non-Annex I countries
as (i) most of these countries are not obliged to limit their GHG emissions during the second
budget period, and (ii) necessary data are lacking at the individual country level. In fact, non-
Annex I countries have been grouped in six sub-regions, i.e. Africa, Asia, the Former Soviet
Union (FSU non-Annex I), Latin America, the Middle East and Oceania. It has been assumed
that each sub-region as a whole is not subject to a GHG abatement commitment. However, non-
Annex I countries participate in international climate policies by means of the Clean Develop-
ment Mechanism, i.e. by generating emission credits through abatement projects and selling
these credits to Annex I countries in order to meet the latter’s commitment at reduced costs.11
The cost implications of any burden sharing regime depend on (i) the emission abatement po-
tentials and marginal costs of all countries/regions involved, (ii) the emission reduction re-
quirements of the countries/regions concerned, and (iii) the potential use of the Kyoto Mecha-
nisms, i.e. the trade effects of domestic versus foreign abatement transactions. Hence, the
structure of this chapter runs as follows. Firstly, mitigation potentials and costs of major coun-
tries/regions are briefly discussed in Section 3.2. Subsequently, Section 3.3 addresses the emis-
sion reduction requirements of Annex I countries/regions with regard to the second budget pe-
riod. Finally, Section 3.4 analyses the trade and cost effects of the multi-sector convergence ap-
proach (both including and excluding the use of Kyoto Mechanisms). Throughout this chapter,
these effects will be compared to those of the burden differentiation regime agreed in the Kyoto
Protocol with regard to the first budget period.
3.2 Emission abatement potentials and marginal costs
Chapter 2 has illustrated that emission reduction costs and potentials can be expressed graphi-
cally by means of marginal cost curves. As part of previous ECN studies regarding the role and
impact of the Kyoto Mechanisms, marginal cost curves have been constructed for a variety of
countries and regions, including:
• each individual western Annex I country (western Annex I),
• the Annex I region of Central and East Europe/Former Soviet Union (CEE/FSU Annex I),
• each non-Annex I region, notably the FSU non-Annex I region, Africa, Asia, Oceania and
the Middle East (non-Annex I).
Figure 3.1 shows the aggregated marginal cost curves for reducing GHG emissions in the west-
ern Annex I region, the non-Annex I region and the CEE/FSU Annex I region. It indicates that
the potential of abatement options at relatively low costs are generally much larger in both non-
Annex I and CEE/FSU Annex I countries than in western Annex I countries. In addition, Figure
3.1 illustrates that both the non-Annex I region and the CEE/FSU Annex I region have each a
large potential of about 800 Mt of no-regret options, i.e. reduction options with negative mar-
                                                
10 CEE/FSU Annex I countries have been grouped into one region because of model simplicity and data considera-
tions.
11 See the discussion on the participation of non-Annex I countries in Jansen et al. (2000).
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ginal costs. It is still unclear whether these ‘profitable potentials’ will be allowed to be used as
part of the Kyoto Protocol in general and the Kyoto Mechanisms in particular (Sijm et al.,
2000). Hence, in considering the trade and cost effects of the multi-sector convergence approach
(see Section 3.4), two cases will be distinguished. In case A, reduction options at negative mar-
ginal costs in non-Annex I and CEE/FSU Annex I countries are excluded from the analysis,
whereas this ‘profitable potential’ is included in case B.
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Figure 3.1  Marginal reduction cost curves in major regions of the world
3.3 Emission reduction requirements
Emission reduction requirements are defined as the difference between the expected (baseline)
emissions in the year 2010/2015 and the so-called ‘emission limitation target’, i.e. the assigned
amount of GHG emissions in 2010/2015 based on a certain percentage - for instance, 90 or 95
percent - of the emission level in the reference year. Table 3.1 summarises the estimated GHG
emission levels in 1990, 2010 and 2015, the emission limitation targets and the resulting emis-
sion reduction requirements for each western Annex I country as well as for the Annex I coun-
tries of the CEE/FSU region as a whole.
Table 3.1 shows that the emission limitation targets of the Annex I countries are, on average,
lower with regard to the first budget period (-5.2 percent) than regarding the second budget pe-
riod (-7.7 percent). However, as the projected increase in baseline emissions is more significant
in the years 1990-2010 (11.4 percent) than between 2010 and 2015 (6.2 percent), the emission
reduction requirements in absolute amounts are higher for the first budget period (2.9 billion
tonnes CO2 eq.) than for the second budget period (2.5 billion tonnes CO2 eq.). Moreover, these
aggregated figures hide major differences at the disaggregated level of individual countries and
regions. For instance, emission reduction requirements for the USA decrease from almost 2.0
billion tonnes in the first budget period to less than 0.8 billion tonnes in the second budget pe-
riod, whereas they increase for the CEE/FSU Annex I region as a whole from, on average, 0 to
more than 1.0 billion tonnes CO2 eq. Note that the emission reduction targets of columns 4 and
5 in Table 3.1. have a relative meaning as an indicator of burden sharing among countries as
real emission reduction requirements are not only (or mainly) determined by these targets and
emissions levels of the base year, but also - sometimes even predominantly - by emission levels
in the year 2010 or 2015 as determined by population and economic growth as well as other
autonomous trends affecting baseline emission levels.
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Table 3.1.  Emission levels, limitation targets and reduction requirements of Annex I countries
(first and second budget period)a
Country/region GHG baseline emissionsb Emission limitation targets Emission reduction requirements
(in MtC02eq.) (as reduction
percentage,
in %)c
(as assigned
amounts,
in MtC02eq.)
(in MtC02eq.) (as reduction
percentage,
in %)d
1990 2010 2015 2010 2015 2010 2015 2010 2015 2010 2015
Australia 423 496 517 -8 5.2 456 433 40 44 8 9
Austria 79 86 88 13 6.0 69 65 17 6 20 9
Belgium 130 144 148 7.5 7.8 120 111 24 13 16 11
Canada 340 402 419 6 5.3 320 303 82 34 20 10
Denmark 73 79 80 21 6.0 58 54 21 5 27 8
Finland 64 83 89 0 7.6 64 59 19 11 23 16
France 501 515 518 0 5.3 501 474 14 30 3 6
Germany 1203 976 1005 21 7.7 951 877 25 103 3 11
Greece 101 147 162 -25 8.5 126 116 22 24 15 18
Iceland 3 4 5 -10 4.3 3 3 1 1 29 22
Ireland 53 69 74 -13 7.8 60 55 9 10 13 15
Italy 511 592 614 6.5 7.8 478 441 113 60 19 12
Japan 1333 1587 1658 6 7.2 1253 1162 334 162 21 12
Luxembourg 16 12 12 28 13.8 12 10 0 2 0 17
Netherlands 225 258 267 6 7.2 212 196 47 24 18 11
New Zealand 69 105 117 0 5.1 69 65 36 16 34 20
Norway 43 52 55 -1 6.4 44 41 8 6 16 14
Portugal 68 86 91 -23.9 6.4 84 79 2 10 3 11
Spain 294 358 375 -15 6.3 338 317 19 39 5 11
Sweden 67 76 79 -4 3.5 69 67 7 5 9 7
Switzerland 53 66 70 8 5.6 49 46 17 7 26 13
United Kingdom 752 699 720 12.5 6.4 658 616 42 62 6 9
USA 6187 7751 8200 7 5.6 5754 5434 1997 769 26 13
Western Annex I 12588 14645 15363 6.7 6.2 11748 11024 2898 1441 20 12
CEE/FSU Annex I 4885 4813 5295 1.5 11.5 4813 4258 0 1037 0 20
Total Annex I 17473 19458 20658 5.2 7.7 16561 15282 2898 2478 15 14
a) The year 2010 represents the first budget period (2008-2012) and the year 2015 the second budget period (2013-
2017).
b) For an explanation of baseline emissions in 2010 and 2015, see Chapter 2 and references cited there.
c) A positive figure means that emissions should decrease by the percentage indicated, whereas a negative sign
implies that they are allowed to increase by the percentage recorded. For 2010, the limitation rates - as agreed in
the Kyoto Protocol - refer to the reference year 1990. For 2015, these rates refer to the previous period - 2010,
i.e. the first budget period - as derived by the multi-sector convergence approach described in Working Paper no.
5 (Jansen et al., 2000).
d) For 2010, the reduction requirements are calculated as a percentage of baseline emissions in 2010. For 2015,
these requirements are calculated as a percentage of baseline emissions in 2015 corrected for the emissions
limitations that have been implemented during the first budget period as part of the Kyoto Protocol.
3.4 Trade and costs effects
3.4.1 Main results
Table 3.2 presents the main trade and cost effects of the Kyoto Mechanisms during the first
budget period (Kyoto Protocol) versus the second budget period (multi-sector convergence ap-
proach). As noted, two cases are distinguished. In case A, reduction options at negative mar-
ginal costs in non-Annex I and CEE/FSU Annex I countries are excluded from the analysis,
whereas this ‘profitable potential’ is included in case B. For reasons of convenience, case A
during the first budget period is indicated as A1 and during the second budget period as A2. The
same indication applies to case B (i.e. B1 versus B2)
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Table 3.2  Main trade and cost effects of the Kyoto Mechanisms during the first and second
budget period
First budget period
(Kyoto Protocol)
Second budget period 
(Multi-sector approach)
Case A1 Case B1 Case A2 Case B2
Reduction requirements Annex I [Mt] 2898 2898 2478 2478
Equilibrium price of emission credits [US$/t] 8 3 24 10
Reduction requirements achieved domestically [Mt] 1040 543 1410 1070
Total trade in emission credits [Mt] 1858 2355 1068 1408
  As % of Annex I reduction requirements 64% 81% 43% 57%
ET within western Annex I region [Mt] 70 8 126 3
JI export CEE/FSU Annex I region [Mt] 254 900 0 0
CDM export non-Annex I region (Mt] 1534 1447 942 1406
Total reduction costs before trade (mUS$95) 75753 75753 133270 133270
Total reduction costs after trade (mUS$95) 10321 1578 35100 15953
Average costs per tonne before trade [US$95/t] 26.1 26.1 53.8 53.8
Average costs per tonne after trade [US$95/t] 3.6 0.5 14.2 6.4
Average costs per capita before trade [US$95/t] 14.0 14.0 18.4 18.4
Average costs per capita after trade [US$95/t] 1.5 0.2 4.8 2.2
The first row of Table 3.2 provides the estimated reduction requirements of the Annex I coun-
tries as derived in Table 3.1. In case of free trade (i.e. unrestricted use of all Kyoto Mecha-
nisms), these requirements will be met at an international equilibrium price of emission credits
equal to 8 US$ per tonne CO2 eq. in case A1 and 3 US$ in case B1 as far as the first budget pe-
riod is concerned. In the second budget period, on the contrary, this price level will be much
higher - i.e. 24 and 10 US$, respectively - as the cheapest reduction options have already been
used during the first budget period.
Depending on the equilibrium price of emission credits, countries will determine the optimal
level of both their domestic emission reductions and their foreign trade transactions in emission
credits. For instance, in case A2 (i.e. an equilibrium price of 24 US$ per tonne), the Annex I
countries will reduce 1410 Mt GHG emissions at home and import emission credits equal to an
amount of 1068 Mt (Table 3.2). In case B2, however, the equilibrium price of emission credits
will be lower (10 US$ per tonne). As a result, Annex I countries will reduce less GHG emis-
sions at home (1070 Mt) and import more emission credits abroad (1408 Mt). In both cases, im-
ported emission credits are predominantly achieved through CDM transactions with non-Annex
I countries and hardly by ET transactions within the western Annex I region. JI transactions
with countries in the CEE/FSU Annex I region are estimated to be 0 during the second budget
period in contrast to the first budget period when they account for a substantial part of total
trade in emission credits.12
In addition to the above-mentioned trade effects, Table 3.2 also presents the main cost effects of
the decision to enable Annex I countries to meet their reduction requirements by means of
Kyoto Mechanisms. It shows that, in case A1, global abatement costs are estimated to tumble
from almost 76 billion US$ ‘before trade’ to 10 billion US$ after trade’ (i.e. after relying on the
Kyoto Mechanisms). Including no-regret options in the non-Annex I and CEE/FSU Annex I re-
gions (case B1) results in a further decrease of total abatement costs to 1.6 billion US$. In the
latter case, the average reduction costs per tonne will be only 0.5 US$ compared to 26 US$ ‘be-
fore trade’. Similar, although slightly less spectacular cost savings will be realised during the
second budget period (cases A2 and B2). Hence, it may be concluded that the decision to intro-
duce JI, CDM and ET may result in tremendous global savings of total abatement costs, par-
                                                
12 It is assumed that Emissions Trading (ET) will mainly occur within the western Annex I region, and Joint Implementation (JI)
between this region and the CEE/FSU Annex I region.
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ticularly if no-regret options in non-Annex I and CEE/FSU Annex I regions are included in
global abatement strategies.
Table 3.3  First budget period: domestic reductions and foreign trade effects of using Kyoto
Mechanisms (Kyoto Protocol)
Reduction
requirements [Mt]
Domestic reductions [Mt]
Case A1 Case B1
Trade in emission credits [Mt]
Case A1 Case B1
Trade as % of requirements
Case A1 Case B1
Australia 40  23  13 -17 -27 43 69
Austria 17  5  3 -13 -14 73 80
Belgium 24  8  4 -16 -20 66 84
Canada 82  31  18 -51 -64 63 78
Denmark 21  4  2 -17 -19 83 91
Finland 19  7  3 -13 -17 65 86
France 14  36  17 22 3 -158 -22
Germany 25  59  29 34 4 -135 -14
Greece 22  11  6 -10 -16 48 74
Iceland 1  1 0 -1 -1 81 108
Ireland 9  6  3 -3 -6 29 64
Italy 113  25  11 -88 -102 78 90
Japan 334  57  48 -278 -286 83 86
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 N.A. N.A.
Netherlands 47  19  10 -27 -36 59 78
New Zealand 36  21  9 -15 -27 43 76
Norway 8  3  2 -6 -7 70 78
Portugal 2  7  4 4 1 -183 -49
Spain 19  28  14 9 -5 -48 26
Sweden 7  2  1 -5 -6 76 87
Switzerland 17  3  3 -14 -15 80 84
United Kingdom 42  20  10 -22 -32 52 77
USA 1997  734  341 -1263 -1656 63 83
CEE+ FSU Annex I 0  254  900 254 900 N.A. N.A.
Africa 0  113  68 113 68 N.A. N.A.
Asia 0  1116  1001 1116 1001 N.A. N.A.
FSU non-Annex I 0  96  41 96 41 N.A. N.A.
Latin America 0  151  177 151 177 N.A. N.A.
Middle East 0  57  159 57 159 N.A. N.A.
Oceania 0  1 0 1 0 N.A. N.A.
N.A.  Data not available since reduction requirements are equal to zero.
3.4.2 Disaggregated trade effects
Disaggregated results with regard to the trade effects of the Kyoto Mechanisms are presented in
Tables 3.3 and 3.4 for the first and second budget periods, respectively. These trade effects con-
cern the optimal levels of domestic emission reductions and foreign trade transactions in emis-
sion credits. Table 3.4 shows that, in case A2, several western Annex I countries will achieve 50
percent or more of their reduction requirements by importing emission credits - through one or
all Kyoto Mechanisms - and the remaining share by domestic measures. Together, the western
Annex I countries will import 1410 Mt of emission credits, i.e. about 43 percent of their total
reduction requirements.
Note that in case A2, with an equilibrium price level of 24 US$ per emission credit, it would be
most efficient for some western Annex I countries to export emission credits. These countries
include particularly Canada and the USA. Their total export of emission credits, however, is
equivalent to only 126 Mt (Table 3.2). In case A2, the main exporters of emission credits are
CDM countries in Asia (665 Mt) and Latin America (61 Mt).
In case B2 (including no regret options), the equilibrium price of emission credits will be much
lower (10 US$). In this case, western Annex I countries will even rely more on the use of Kyoto
Mechanisms as, on average, some 57 percent of their reduction requirements will be covered by
imports of emission credits (see Table 3.2). Compared to case A2 discussed above, the inclusion
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of no-regret options will increase exports of emission credits by CDM countries from 942 Mt to
1406 Mt, whereas the amount of ET transactions between western Annex I countries will de-
crease from 126 to 3 Mt.
Table 3.4  Second budget period: domestic reductions and foreign trade effects of using Kyoto
Mechanisms (Multi-sector convergence approach)
Reduction
requirements [Mt]
Domestic reductions [Mt]
Case A2 Case B2
Trade in emission credits [Mt]
Case A2 Case B2
Trade as % of requirement
Case A2 Case B2
Australia 44 12 16 -33 -29 73 64
Austria 6 4 2 -2 -4 38 66
Belgium 13 14 7 0 -6 -2 48
Canada 34 38 19 4 -15 -13 43
Denmark 5 3 2 -1 -3 30 55
Finland 11 9 6 -1 -4 12 41
France 30 25 29 -5 -1 17 4
Germany 103 36 46 -67 -57 65 56
Greece 25 19 8 -7 -17 26 67
Iceland 1 1 1 0 0 24 14
Ireland 10 5 5 -4 -5 45 48
Italy 60 27 22 -33 -38 55 63
Japan 161 66 13 -95 -148 59 92
Luxembourg 2 1 0 -1 -2 68 77
Netherlands 24 25 13 1 -11 -5 44
New Zealand 15 17 18 1 3 -9 -17
Norway 6 2 1 -3 -4 60 75
Portugal 10 8 4 -2 -6 18 57
Spain 39 40 21 1 -18 -3 45
Sweden 5 3 1 -2 -4 42 77
Switzerland 7 5 1 -2 -6 30 82
United Kingdom 62 33 36 -29 -26 47 42
USA 769 886 597 118 -171 -15 22
CEE+ FSU Annex I 1037 405 223 -632 -814 61 78
Africa 0 36 103 36 103 N.A. N.A.
Asia 0 665 1023 665 1023 N.A. N.A.
FSU non-Annex I 0 31 88 31 88 N.A. N.A.
Latin America 0 61 138 61 138 N.A. N.A.
Middle East 0 21 51 21 51 N.A. N.A.
Oceania 0 2 1 2 1 N.A. N.A.
N.A.  Data not available since reduction requirements are equal to zero.
The results of Table 3.4 - which concern the multi-sector convergence approach - can be com-
pared with those of Table 3.3, which refer to the burden differentiation among Annex I coun-
tries as agreed in the Kyoto Protocol. The main difference between these two burden sharing
approaches is that emission trade as a percentage of total reduction requirements is, on average,
significantly higher in both cases of the first budget period (A1 and B1) than of the second
budget period (A2 and B2, see also Table 3.2). This results from the fact that after relying on the
most efficient trade options during the first budget period, the differences in cost structures be-
tween the countries and regions involved are less outspoken during the second budget period.
Another major difference between the first and second budget period is that the CEE/FSU An-
nex I region switches from a major exporter of JI credits during the first budget period to a sig-
nificant importer of emission credits in the second budget period. This switch in trade position
can be ascribed to the combination of two factors, i.e. (i) the reduction requirements of the
CEE/FSU Annex I countries increase from, on average, 0 Mt in the first budget period to more
than 1 billion Mt during the second budget period, and (ii) a major part of the cheapest domestic
abatement options in the CEE/FSU Annex I region is used to export emission credits during the
first budget period and is, hence, not available during the second budget period.
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Table 3.5  First budget period: costs effects of using Kyoto Mechanisms (Kyoto Protocol)
Costs before trade
[M US$95]
Costs after trade
[M US$95]
Costs as % of GDP 2010 Net gains as % of GDP 2010
After trade
Case A1 Case B1
Before trade
Case A1 Case B1   Case A1 Case B1   
Australia 371 196 92 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.06
Austria 1167 104 43 0.37 0.03 0.01 0.34 0.36
Belgium 298 147 64 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.06
Canada 1090 474 205 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.08 0.11
Denmark 859 143 58 0.37 0.06 0.03 0.31 0.35
Finland 266 122 54 0.16 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.13
France 11 -50 9 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Germany 20 -69 19 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Greece 162 115 53 0.13 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.09
Iceland 14 10 5 0.15 0.11 0.05 0.04 0.10
Ireland 46 40 20 0.06 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.03
Italy 7551 764 320 0.52 0.05 0.02 0.46 0.49
Japan 32222 2179 864 0.48 0.03 0.01 0.45 0.47
Luxembourg 0 -1 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Netherlands 506 266 117 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.07
New Zealand 282 192 93 0.42 0.29 0.14 0.13 0.28
Norway 242 49 20 0.12 0.03 0.01 0.10 0.11
Portugal 0 -13 0 0.00 -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00
Spain 33 19 29 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sweden 128 46 19 0.04 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.04
Switzerland 1061 111 44 0.26 0.03 0.01 0.23 0.25
United Kingdom 595 231 106 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.03
USA 28830 12154 5341 0.30 0.13 0.06 0.18 0.25
Tot. western Annex I 75753 17230 7574 0.26 0.06 0.03 0.20 0.23
CEE+ FSU Annex I 0 -1029 -2557 0.00 -0.09 -0.23 0.09 0.23
Total Annex I 75753 16201 5017 0.25 0.05 0.02 0.20 0.23
Africa 0 -432 -138 0.00 -0.06 -0.02 0.06 0.02
Asia 0 -4277 -2347 0.00 -0.08 -0.05 0.08 0.05
FSU non-Annex I 0 -370 -68 0.00 -0.17 -0.03 0.17 0.03
Latin America 0 -580 -442 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.02
Middle East 0 -217 -444 0.00 -0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.03
Oceania 0 -5 -1 0.00 -0.05 -0.01 0.05 0.01
Total non-Annex I 0 -5881 -3439 0.00 -0.06 -0.03 0.06 0.03
World 75753 10321 1578 0.19 0.03 0.00 0.16 0.18
3.4.3 Disaggregated cost effects
Owing to the Kyoto Mechanisms, global abatement costs to meet reduction requirements of
Annex I countries during the second budget period are estimated to tumble from 133 billion
US$ ‘before trade’ to 35 billion US$ ‘after trade’ (case A2, excluding no-regret options), and
even to 16 billion US$ if these options are included (case B2, Table 3.2). Table 3.6 provides a
more detailed picture of these cost effects for the individual western Annex I countries, the
western Annex I region as a whole, the CEE/FSU Annex I region and the other, non-Annex I
regions of the world. It shows that, before trade, abatement costs in absolute terms are mainly
born by major western Annex I countries such as Italy, Japan and the US due to either high re-
duction requirements or relatively high domestic reduction costs (or a combination of both fac-
tors). Total abatement costs of these three countries amount to 109 billion US$, i.e. some 82
percent of all cost to meet the reduction requirements of the western Annex I countries.
After trade, however, total abatement costs of the western Annex I countries fall from 132 bil-
lion US$ to 23 billion US$ (case A2). Although, in absolute terms, the US, Japan and Italy
benefit most from using the Kyoto Mechanisms to meet their reduction requirements, they still
account for the major share (i.e. 15 billion US$ or almost 66 percent) of total abatement costs
born by western Annex I countries. Moreover, whereas most western Annex I countries benefit
from trade in the sense that they have to make less costs to meet their reduction requirements,
non-Annex I countries will benefit in the sense that they can make real profits by exporting
ECN-C--01-008 19
emission credits to Annex I countries. In case A2, such profits will be mainly realised by coun-
tries in Asia (7.5 billion US$) and in Latin America (0.8 billion US$).
Table 3.6  Second budget period: costs effects of using Kyoto Mechanisms (Multi-sector
convergence approach)a
Costs before trade
[M USD95]
Costs after trade
[M USD95]
Costs as % of GDP 2015 Net gains as % of GDP 2015
After trade
Case A2 Case B2
Before trade 
Case A2 Case B2 Case A2 Case B2
Australia 2987 947 393 0.60 0.19 0.08 0.41 0.52
Austria 1351 114 54 0.39 0.03 0.02 0.36 0.37
Belgium 742 204 109 0.19 0.05 0.03 0.13 0.16
Canada 2317 499 276 0.27 0.06 0.03 0.21 0.24
Denmark 605 88 42 0.24 0.03 0.02 0.20 0.22
Finland 702 172 84 0.38 0.09 0.05 0.28 0.33
France 179 475 201 0.01 0.02 0.01 -0.01 0.00
Germany 1805 2110 878 0.05 0.06 0.02 -0.01 0.03
Greece 774 460 228 0.57 0.34 0.17 0.23 0.40
Iceland 331 0 5 3.18 0.00 0.04 3.18 3.13
Ireland 664 179 78 0.73 0.20 0.09 0.53 0.65
Italy 14900 1187 523 0.92 0.07 0.03 0.85 0.89
Japan 49085 3408 1595 0.67 0.05 0.02 0.63 0.65
Luxembourg 166 36 16 0.74 0.16 0.07 0.59 0.68
Netherlands 1779 368 197 0.30 0.06 0.03 0.24 0.27
New Zealand 858 201 89 1.18 0.28 0.12 0.90 1.05
Norway 670 112 50 0.31 0.05 0.02 0.26 0.29
Portugal 103 182 91 0.07 0.12 0.06 -0.05 0.01
Spain 461 606 321 0.06 0.07 0.04 -0.02 0.02
Sweden 257 99 47 0.08 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.06
Switzerland 1279 124 63 0.29 0.03 0.01 0.26 0.27
United Kingdom 4965 881 368 0.30 0.05 0.02 0.25 0.28
USA 45442 10697 5653 0.43 0.10 0.05 0.33 0.38
Tot. western Annex I 132425 23148 11361 0.41 0.07 0.04 0.34 0.37
CEE+ FSU Annex I 845 21632 9726 0.06 1.62 0.73 -1.56 -0.66
Total Annex I 133270 44780 21087 0.39 0.13 0.06 0.26 0.33
Africa 0 -543 -379 0.00 -0.07 -0.05 0.07 0.05
Asia 0 -7549 -3731 0.00 -0.12 -0.06 0.12 0.06
FSU non-Annex I 0 -470 -325 0.00 -0.18 -0.13 0.18 0.13
Latin America 0 -811 -505 0.00 -0.02 -0.02 0.02 0.02
Middle East 0 -287 -186 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01
Oceania 0 -21 -8 0.00 -0.19 -0.07 0.19 0.07
Total non-Annex I 0 -9680 -5134 0.00 -0.08 -0.04 0.08 0.04
World 133270 35100 15953 0.29 0.08 0.03 0.21 0.26
a) The case ‘before trade’ concerns the situation where emission reduction requirements are met fully by only domestic actions in
both the first and second budget periods. Case A2 (B2) refers to the situation where no-regret options are excluded (included)
in both the first and second budget periods.
The distribution of net gains owing to the use of Kyoto Mechanisms will show some significant
changes, however, if no-regret options are included (case B2). Total abatement costs of all
western Annex I countries will fall to 11 billion US$. Again, the US, Japan and Italy will bene-
fit most in absolute terms, but still they account for some 68 percent (i.e. 7.8 billion US$) of all
costs born by the western Annex I countries. Net real profits of exporting countries in the non-
Annex I region will decrease from 9.7 billion US$ in case A2 to 5.1 billion US$ in case B2.
This decrease is explained by the fact that, due to the inclusion of no-regret options, the quantity
of emission credits exported by these regions indeed increases, but this effect is more than offset
by the resulting decrease in the equilibrium price of these credits.
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Table 3.7  First budget period: Average costs to meet reduction requirements (Kyoto Protocol)
Average costs per tonne
before trade
[US$/t]
Average costs per tonne
after trade
[US$/t]
Average costs per capita
before trade
[US$95/CAP2010]
Average costs per capita
after trade
[US$95/CAP2010]
Case A1 Case B1 Case A1 Case B1
Australia 9.3 4.9 2.3 21.8 9.8 4.6
Austria 67.4 6.0 2.5 145.9 13.0 5.3
Belgium 12.6 6.2 2.7 29.8 14.7 6.4
Canada 13.3 5.8 2.5 40.4 14.8 6.4
Denmark 41.0 6.8 2.8 171.8 28.7 11.7
Finland 13.7 6.3 2.8 53.3 24.4 10.8
France 0.7 -1.4 0.6 0.2 -0.8 0.2
Germany 0.8 -1.2 0.6 0.2 -0.8 0.2
Greece 7.5 5.3 2.5 16.2 10.4 4.8
Iceland 10.6 7.9 3.5 13.8 10.3 4.5
Ireland 5.1 4.4 2.3 11.5 9.9 5.0
Italy 66.6 6.7 2.8 130.2 13.6 5.7
Japan 96.4 6.5 2.6 251.7 17.0 6.8
Luxembourg 0.0 -4.0 -1.6 0.0 -1.0 -0.2
Netherlands 10.8 5.7 2.5 33.7 16.7 7.3
New Zealand 7.9 5.3 2.6 94.1 48.1 23.2
Norway 28.7 5.8 2.4 60.5 9.9 4.0
Portugal 0.0 -2.0 -0.1 0.0 -1.3 0.0
Spain 1.7 0.7 1.5 0.8 0.5 0.7
Sweden 18.2 6.5 2.7 16.0 5.1 2.1
Switzerland 61.0 6.4 2.6 151.6 15.8 6.3
United Kingdom 14.3 5.6 2.5 10.4 3.9 1.8
USA 14.4 6.1 2.7 106.8 40.9 18.0
CEE/FSU Annex I 0.0 -4.0 -2.8 0.0 -3.4 -8.5
World 26.1 3.6 0.5 14.5 1.5 0.2
The last two columns of Table 3.6 express net gains of using Kyoto Mechanisms as a share of
the estimated GDP in 2015. In these terms, the countries that benefit most include Italy, Japan,
Iceland and Luxembourg, mainly due to their relatively high domestic reduction costs.
The most important exception to the cost savings patterns discussed above concerns the
CEE/FSU Annex I region. For the second budget period, abatement costs before trade are esti-
mated at 0.8 billion US$. After trade, however, these costs increase to 9.7 billion US$ in case
B2 and even to 22 billion US$ in case A2. At first sight, this outcome seems to contradict both
economic theory and common sense that states that international trade benefits all parties in-
volved. The outcome, however, can be explained by the methodology used to estimate abate-
ment costs during the second budget period. The case ‘before trade’ presented in Table 3.6 (and
other tables referring to the second budget period) concerns the situation where emission reduc-
tion requirements are met fully by only domestic actions in both the first and second budget pe-
riods. On the other hand, case A2 (B2) refers to the situation where no-regret options are ex-
cluded (included) in both the first and second budget periods. Hence, from both a theoretical
and a common-sensible point of view, it would be more adequate to compare the costs of either
case A2 or case B2 with the costs of the ‘no trade’ option during the second budget period after
either case A1 or B1 has been applied during the first budget period. In that case, costs before
trade will be higher than after trade and, hence, it makes sense to rely on the Kyoto Mechanisms
(as economic theory would suggest).
Regarding the contents of the issue mentioned above, an additional explanation is at stake. For
the first budget period, reduction requirements of the CEE/FSU Annex I region as a whole is, on
average, 0 MT.13 As a result, this region exports large amounts of JI emission credits in both
cases A1 and B1 at relatively low international price levels (see Tables 3.2 and 3.3). For the
second budget period, however, the reduction requirements of the CEE/FSU Annex I region are
                                                
13 Although the CEE/FSU Annex I region has accepted a reduction target of, on average, 1.5 percent of its 1990
emission level, reduction requirements turn out to be 0 Mt as baseline emissions in 2010 are estimated to decline
autonomously to the assigned amounts of GHG emissions for this year.
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estimated at more than 1 billion Mt (Table 3.4). Whereas this region exports a major part of its
cheapest reduction options at relatively low prices during the first budget period (in either case
A1 or B1), it imports a major part of its reduction requirements at relatively high prices during
the second budget period.14
Table 3.8  Second budget period: Average costs to meet reduction requirements (Multi-sector
Convergence Approach)a
Average costs per tonne
before trade
[US$/t]
Average costs per tonne
after trade
[US$/t]
Average costs per capita
before trade
[US$95/CAP2010]
Average costs per capita
after trade
[US$95/CAP2010]
Case A2 Case B2 Case A2 Case B2
Australia 67.9 21.5 8.9 143.4 45.5 18.9
Austria 225.2 19.0 9.0 168.9 14.3 6.8
Belgium 57.1 15.7 8.4 74.2 20.4 10.9
Canada 68.1 14.7 8.1 69.4 14.9 8.3
Denmark 121.0 17.6 8.4 121.0 17.6 8.4
Finland 63.8 15.6 7.6 140.4 34.4 16.8
France 6.0 15.8 6.7 2.9 7.8 3.3
Germany 17.5 20.5 8.5 21.8 25.5 10.6
Greece 31.0 18.4 9.1 68.7 40.8 20.2
Iceland 331.0 0.0 5.0 331.0 0.0 5.0
Ireland 66.4 17.9 7.8 166.0 44.8 19.5
Italy 248.3 19.8 8.7 268.4 21.4 9.4
Japan 304.9 21.2 9.9 383.5 26.6 12.5
Luxembourg 83.0 18.0 8.0 166.0 36.0 16.0
Netherlands 74.1 15.3 8.2 109.4 22.6 12.1
New Zealand 57.2 13.4 5.9 199.6 46.8 20.7
Norway 111.7 18.7 8.3 126.7 21.2 9.5
Portugal 10.3 18.2 9.1 10.3 18.2 9.1
Spain 11.8 15.5 8.2 11.8 15.5 8.2
Sweden 51.4 19.8 9.4 27.7 10.7 5.1
Switzerland 182.7 17.7 9.0 182.7 17.7 9.0
United Kingdom 80.1 14.2 5.9 81.7 14.5 6.1
USA 59.1 13.9 7.4 149.4 35.2 18.6
CEE/FSU Annex I 0.8 20.9 9.4 2.8 72.2 32.4
World 53.8 14.2 6.4 18.4 4.8 2.2
a) The case ‘before trade’ concerns the situation where emission reduction requirements are met fully by only domestic actions in
both the first and second budget periods. Case A2 (B2) refers to the situation where no-regret options are excluded (included)
in both the first and second budget periods.
A comparison of Table 3.5 (Kyoto Protocol) and Table 3.6 (multi-sector convergence approach)
reveals that abatement costs - both before and after trade - are generally substantially higher in
the second budget period than in the first budget period. As a percentage of GDP, however,
global abatement costs rise only from 0.2 percent in the first budget period to 0.3 percent in the
second budget period.
Finally, Tables 3.7 and 3.8 present the average costs per tonne and per capita of meeting reduc-
tion requirements, both before and after trade. Table 3.8 (second budget period) shows that av-
erage abatement costs at the global level decrease from 54 US$/tonne before trade to 14 and 6.4
US$ after trade in cases A2 and B2, respectively. In per capita terms, these costs decline from
18 US$ to 4.8 and 2.2 US$, respectively. These average figures, however, hide major differ-
ences between countries and regions. In case B2, for instance, average abatement costs per
tonne or per capita hardly decrease due to the trade option in countries such as Spain or Portu-
gal, whereas they tumble significantly in countries such as Japan or Iceland.
                                                
14 For case A2, a similar explanation also applies to countries such as France, Germany, Portugal and Spain. These
countries export ET credits at relatively low prices during the first budget period (A1), but import emission credits
at relatively high prices during the second budget period (A2). As a result, abatement costs after trade (A2) seem to
be higher than ‘before trade’, although – as explained in the main text – this is mainly a result of the methodology
and presentation applied in Table 3.6.
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4. INDICATORS OF BURDEN SHARING: SUMMARY AND
CONCLUSION
The analysis in the previous chapter can be summarised by comparing some indicators of bur-
den sharing among Annex I countries. In Table 3.9 - referring to the first budget period of the
Kyoto Protocol - five indicators are recorded:
1. Emission limitation targets for the year 2010, expressed as a reduction percentage of emis-
sion levels in the base year 1990. These targets originate from the Kyoto Protocol and the
subsequent burden differentiation among the Member States of the EU.
2. Emission reduction requirements in 2010, expressed as an abatement percentage of emis-
sions levels in the year 2010 (which stands for the first budget period 2008-2012).
3. Reduction costs as a percentage of GDP in 2010, excluding both no-regret options and the
use of Kyoto Mechanisms.
4. Reduction costs as a percentage of GDP in 2010, excluding no-regret options but including
the use of Kyoto Mechanisms.
5. Reduction costs as a percentage of GDP in 2010, including both no-regret options and the
use of Kyoto Mechanisms.
Table 3.9  First budget period: Indicators of burden sharing (Kyoto Protocol)
Emission limitation
targets for 2010
Emission reduction
requirements in 2010
Costs as % of GDP 2010
(as reduction % of
1990 emissions)a
(as reduction % of
2010 emissions)
Before trade After trade
Case A1 Case B1
Luxembourg 28 New Zealand 34 Italy 0.52 New Zealand 0.29 New Zealand 0.14
Denmark 21 Iceland 29 Japan 0.48 USA 0.13 USA 0.06
Germany 21 Denmark 27 New Zealand 0.42 Iceland 0.11 Iceland 0.05
Austria 13 Switzerland 26 Austria 0.37 Greece 0.09 Greece 0.04
UK 12.5 USA 26 Denmark 0.37 Finland 0.07 Canada 0.03
Switzerland 8 Finland 23 USA 0.30 Canada 0.06 Denmark 0.03
Belgium 7.5 Japan 21 Switzerland 0.26 Denmark 0.06 Finland 0.03
USA 7 Austria 20 Finland 0.16 Ireland 0.05 Australia 0.02
Italy 6.5 Canada 20 Iceland 0.15 Italy 0.05 Belgium 0.02
Canada 6 Italy 19 Canada 0.14 Netherlands 0.05 Ireland 0.02
Japan 6 Netherlands 18 Greece 0.13 Australia 0.04 Italy 0.02
Netherlands 6 Belgium 16 Norway 0.12 Belgium 0.04 Netherlands 0.02
CEE/FSU 1.5 Norway 16 Netherlands 0.09 Austria 0.03 Austria 0.01
Finland 0 Greece 15 Australia 0.08 Japan 0.03 Japan 0.01
France 0 Ireland 13 Belgium 0.08 Norway 0.03 Norway 0.01
New Zealand 0 Sweden 9 Ireland 0.06 Switzerland 0.03 Sweden 0.01
Norway -1 Australia 8 Sweden 0.04 UK 0.02 Switzerland 0.01
Sweden -4 UK 6 UK 0.04 Sweden 0.01 UK 0.01
Australia -8 Spain 5 France 0.00 France 0.00 France 0.00
Iceland -10 France 3 Germany 0.00 Germany 0.00 Germany 0.00
Ireland -13 Germany 3 Luxembourg 0.00 Luxembourg 0.00 Luxembourg 0.00
Spain -15 Portugal 3 Portugal 0.00 Spain 0.00 Portugal 0.00
Portugal -23.9 Luxembourg 0 Spain 0.00 Portugal -0.01 Spain 0.00
Greece -25 CEE/FSU 0 CEE/FSU 0.00 CEE/FSU -0.09 CEE/FSU -0.23
a) A positive figure means that emissions in the first budget period should decrease by the percentage indicated compared to the
level of GHG emissions in 1990, whereas a negative sign implies that they are allowed to increase by the percentage recorded.
For each indicator, countries have been ranked to descending order of burden sharing. The table
reveals that the ranking of countries may differ significantly depending on the indicator used.
For instance, Greece is ranked lowest (position 24) in terms of indicator 1, i.e. according to the
Kyoto Protocol Greece is allowed to increase its emission level in 2010 by 25 percent compared
to 1990 (columns 1-2). However, as growth in GHG emissions over the period 1990-2010 is
relatively high compared to other Annex I countries, Greece is ranked on position 14 in terms of
indicator 2 (columns 3-4). The ranking of Greece increases further to position 11 in terms of re-
duction costs expressed as a percentage of GDP in 2010 (columns 5-6, excluding both no-regret
options and the use of Kyoto Mechanisms). Finally, Greece reaches the fourth position in terms
of reduction costs expressed as a percentage of GDP in 2010 if all Annex I countries are al-
lowed to use the Kyoto Mechanisms unrestrictedly, irrespective whether no-regret options are
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included or excluded (columns 7-10). Similar and other irregular patterns of ranking according
to different indicators of burden sharing can be discerned for other countries such as Australia,
Iceland, New Zealand, Italy or Japan (Table 3.9).
Table 3.10 provides similar indicators of burden sharing for the second budget period as derived
from the multi-sector convergence approach. Significant shifts in ranking per indicator can be
noticed for a variety of countries such as Iceland, New Zealand, Australia, Germany, Italy or the
CEE/FSU Annex I region.
Table 3.10  Second budget period: Indicators of burden sharing (Multi-sector Convergence
Approach)
Emission limitation
targets for 2015
Emission reduction
requirements in 2015
Costs as % of GDP 2015b
(as reduction % of
2010 emissions)a
(as reduction % of
2015 emissions)
Before trade After trade
Case A2 Case B2
Luxembourg 13.8 Iceland 22 Iceland 3.18 CEE/FSU 1.62 CEE/FSU 0.73
CEE/FSU 11.5 New Zealand 20 New Zealand 1.18 Greece 0.34 Greece 0.17
Greece 8.5 CEE/FSU 20 Italy 0.92 New Zealand 0.28 New Zealand 0.12
Ireland 7.8 Greece 18 Luxembourg 0.74 Ireland 0.20 Ireland 0.09
Belgium 7.8 Luxembourg 17 Ireland 0.73 Australia 0.19 Australia 0.08
Italy 7.8 Finland 16 Japan 0.67 Luxembourg 0.16 Luxembourg 0.07
Germany 7.7 Ireland 15 Australia 0.60 Portugal 0.12 Portugal 0.06
Finland 7.6 Norway 14 Greece 0.57 USA 0.10 Finland 0.05
Japan 7.2 Switzerland 13 USA 0.43 Finland 0.09 USA 0.05
Netherlands 7.2 USA 13 Austria 0.39 Italy 0.07 Iceland 0.04
Norway 6.4 Japan 12 Finland 0.38 Spain 0.07 Spain 0.04
Portugal 6.4 Italy 12 Norway 0.31 Canada 0.06 Belgium 0.03
UK 6.4 Portugal 11 Netherlands 0.30 Germany 0.06 Canada 0.03
Spain 6.3 Spain 11 UK 0.30 Netherlands 0.06 Italy 0.03
Austria 6.0 Netherlands 11 Switzerland 0.29 Belgium 0.05 Netherlands 0.03
Denmark 6.0 Belgium 11 Canada 0.27 Japan 0.05 Austria 0.02
Switzerland 5.6 Germany 11 Denmark 0.24 Norway 0.05 Denmark 0.02
USA 5.6 Canada 10 Belgium 0.19 UK 0.05 Germany 0.02
France 5.3 Australia 9 Sweden 0.08 Austria 0.03 Japan 0.02
Canada 5.3 UK 9 Portugal 0.07 Denmark 0.03 Norway 0.02
Australia 5.2 Austria 9 Spain 0.06 Sweden 0.03 UK 0.02
New Zealand 5.1 Denmark 8 CEE/FSU 0.06 Switzerland 0.03 France 0.01
Iceland 4.3 Sweden 7 Germany 0.05 France 0.02 Sweden 0.01
Sweden 3.5 France 6 France 0.01 Iceland 0.00 Switzerland 0.01
a) A positive figure means that emissions in the first budget year should decrease by the percentage indicated compared to the
level of GHG emissions in 2010, whereas a negative sign implies that they are allowed to increase by the percentage recorded.
b) The case ‘before trade’ concerns the situation where emission reduction requirements are met fully by only domestic actions in
both the first and second budget periods. Case A2 (B2) refers to the situation where no-regret options are excluded (included)
in both the first and second budget periods.
The major lesson or conclusion from the above analysis is that allocation based burden sharing
rules in terms of indicator 1 have only a relative meaning compared to other burden sharing in-
dicators included in Tables 3.9 and 3.10. The main reason for this finding is that the burden of
emission mitigation is not only determined by the setting of emission limitation targets for the
year 2010/2015 (expressed as a reduction percentage relative to emission levels in 1990/2010)
but also by other factors such as:
• trends in GHG emissions between 1990 and 2010/2015 as determined by popula-
tion/economic growth and other autonomous (technology) trends regarding GHG emissions,
• major differences in abatement potentials and costs among countries and regions,
• including or excluding the (unrestricted/limited) use of the Kyoto Mechanisms,
• including or excluding no-regret options in (inter)national abatement strategies.
Hence, these factors have to be accounted for when designing and negotiating allocation based
burden sharing rules for the years following the first budget period of the Kyoto Protocol.
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